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Confusion in the Realm of
Taxpayer Standing: The State of State
Taxpayer Standing in the Eighth Circuit
Tarsney v. 0 'Keefe'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tarsney v. O'Keefe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit dismissed a claim for lack of standing brought by Minnesota state
taxpayers challenging a state program that provided abortions for indigent
women. In so doing, the Eighth Circuit applied the holding of Flast v. Cohen,'
the United States Supreme Court case that narrowly limited federal taxpayer
standing. The Eighth Circuit, however, erred in relying on Flast, as that case
applies only to federal taxpayer standing, not state taxpayers. The court should
have interpreted and applied the holding of Doremus v. Board ofEducation of
Borough of Hawthorne,3 the leading Supreme Court case on the issue of state
taxpayer standing, to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the expenditure.
1-. FACTS AND HOLDING
Forty-seven individual Minnesota taxpayers, most of whom belonged to
pro-life religious groups, brought this action against the State of Minnesota,
alleging that the use of state tax money to pay for abortions for low-income
women violated taxpayers' constitutional rights.4 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that the tax program violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and that the program unconstitutionally appropriated public funds
1. 225 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2000).
2. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
3. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
4. See Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 932. The plaintiffs also named the Minnesota
Department of Human Services and the Commissioner of Human Services as defendants.
Id
5. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The two Clauses are known as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, respectively. See Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 934. The United States Supreme Court
applies these two Clauses to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
935.
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for private purposes.6 The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the state
from funding abortions and a refund of the amount of their taxes that the state
used to fund abortion services.7
The state parties moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.8 They argued that taxpayer standing is not available
to raise a claim under the Free Exercise Clause and that the plaintiffs had failed
to allege standing on any other claims.9 The plaintiffs argued in response that
because taxpayers have standing to sue under the Establishment Clause, they
also should have standing to sue under the Free Exercise Clause.'" The district
court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked taxpayer standing and granted the
motion to dismiss."
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs again alleged that the use of
state funds for abortion services violated their Free Exercise Clause rights
because they oppose the practice on religious grounds. 2 They urged the court
to expand the holding of Flast, which recognized taxpayer standing to sue under
the Establishment Clause, while leaving open the question whether such standing
exists under the Free Exercise Clause.13 They argued that the court should
extend Flast to the Free Exercise Clause, because "no heirarchy (sic) of
constitutional values" exists. 4
The Eighth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, disagreed."S The court held
that while the Free Exercise Clause guarantees non-interference by the
government with religious practices, the Clause differs from the Establishment
Clause in that it does not specifically limit the government's spending power.6
Therefore, the court held that taxpayers suffer no direct injury from the abortion
6. See Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 933. The plaintiffs also challenged the validity of Doe
v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995), which held that state funding restrictions for
abortion services violated a woman's right to privacy under the Minnesota constitution.
See Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 933.
7. See Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2000).
8. See id. at 934.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. The district court's decision is unpublished, and the current opinion
does not give the details of the parties' arguments or the basis of the district court's
conclusion. The Eighth Circuit, however, addressed the same issue in its opinion. See
id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 934-35. The plaintiffs also raised two other standing arguments for
the first time on this appeal. See id. at 938-39. These arguments, however, are not
relevant to this Note.
14. Id. at 934.
15. See id. at 938. Judge Diane E. Murphy wrote the opinion of the court, joined
by Judge Gerald W. Heaney.
16. See id. at 936.
[Vol. 66
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expenditure itself." The court concluded that absent a more direct injury, i.e.,
a government expenditure that directly prevents an individual from exercising
religious beliefs, a taxpayer has no standing to sue under the Free Exercise
Clause.' s
The dissent, authored by Judge Magill, agreed that the majority's argument
was persuasive on the issue of federal taxpayer standing, but argued that
Doremus was the controlling case for state taxpayer standing, not Flast'
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the majority should have decided the case
underDoremus and chosen which interpretation of Dorenus it would adopt: the
measurable appropriation standard or the increased tax burden standard20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The General Rule of Standing
Standing is the threshold question for every lawsuit."' The "gist of the
question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Because
standing is a question ofjurisdiction, a court must address standing "even if the
parties fail to raise the issue .... 23
To establish standing, a plaintiff must prove three elements. First, the
plaintiffmust show a direct injury that is (a) "concrete and particularized,"' 4 and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the alleged illegal conduct."
Third, "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision."'2
Although some elements of standing express merely prudential
considerations that are part of judicial self government, in Lujan v. Defenders
17. Seeid. at 938.
18. See id.
19. See id at 940.
20. See id. at 939-42.
21. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,230-31 (1990).
22. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
23. United States v. Hayes, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).
24. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
25. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
26. See id.
27. kd at 561.
28. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham v. Mellon), 262 U.S. 447,
487 (1923) (denying general standing to federal taxpayers because of "attendant
inconveniences" associated with allowing all citizens to challenge federal statutes).
2001]
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of Wildlife,29 Justice Scalia stated that "the core component of standing is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
Ill. '3o This case-or-controversy requirement serves to limit judicial power in two
ways: (1) it limits judicial review to only those questions presented in an
adversary context, and (2) it promotes the separation of powers by defining the
role of the judiciary, thereby preventing that branch from intruding into the
functions of other branches of government.3 The injury-in-fact requirement of
standing serves these power-limiting functions by (1) assuring "concrete
adverseness" by requiring a "personal stake" in the outcome of the case,32 and
(2) promoting the separation of powers by restricting the availability ofjudicial
review.33
A plaintiff usually has no problem meeting the standing threshold because
a traditional case involves a plaintiff who alleges a direct economic or physical
injury. 4 Difficulties arise, however, for plaintiffs outside the traditional class.3"
"Thus, standing may be difficult to establish if the plaintiffcomplains... not as
an injured individual but as a member of some large group, such as taxpayers or
citizens.... .""
29. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
30. Id. at 560. Article III of the United States Constitution provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-
to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another state;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). "Justiciability is the term of art
employed to give expression to this dual limitation .... " Id. at 95.
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
33. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 55 (2d ed. 1994)
("The notion is that by restricting who may sue in federal court, standing limits what
matters the judiciary will address and minimizes judicial review of the actions of the
other branches of government.").
34. See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations
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B. Frothingham v. Mellon-No Standing for Federal Taxpayers
Taxpayer standing to challenge government expenditures began its
turbulent journey in Frothinghamn v. Mellon.' In that case, Mrs. Frothingham
challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Maternity Act, which appropriated
federal tax dollars for the purpose of protecting the health of mothers and
infants.3 Frothingham alleged standing as a taxpayer of the United States,
contending that the act would increase her tax burden, thereby depriving her of
her property without due process of law. 9
The United States Supreme Court denied Frothingham taxpayer standing
and found that a federal taxpayer's interest in the federal treasury was "shared
with millions of others," was "comparatively minute and indeterminable," and
that any injury suffered by a federal taxpayer was therefore "remote, fluctuating
and uncertain." The Court concluded that to establish standing, a federal
taxpayer "must be able to show, not only that the statute [was] invalid, but that
he ha[d] sustained or [was] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of [the statute's] enforcement, and not merely that he
suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people generally."' The
Court reasoned that to exercise its judicial power on such an injury as remote as
a federal taxpayer's would be "not to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal
department, an authority which plainly [the Court does] not possess."42
In dismissing the case, however, the Court distinguished federal taxpayers
from municipal taxpayers.43 The Court noted that the relationship between a
municipal taxpayer and a municipality differs from that of the federal taxpayer
and the federal government because it resembles "the peculiar relation of
corporate taxpayer to the corporation, which is not without some resemblance
to that subsisting between stockholder and private corporation.'"" Therefore, the
Court held that "[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application
of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent
their misuse is not inappropriate." '
37. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
38. See id. at 481.
39. See id at 486.
40. Id. at 487.
41. Id. at 488.
42. Id. at489.
43. See id. at 486-87.
44. Id. at487.
45. Id. at 486. Several circuits have relied on this language to extend taxpayer
standing to municipal taxpayers. See Cammack v. W\aihee, 932 F.2d 765, 770-71 (9th




Elias: Elias: Confusion in the Realm of Taxpayer Standing:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
After Frothingham, then, "[flederal taxpayers could not, as a matter of law,
show sufficient injury to have standing,"" while municipal taxpayers, because
of their "peculiar relation" to the municipality, did have standing to challenge
municipal expenditures in federal court.47 Several years later, however, the
Court would create an exception to this per se bar to federal taxpayer standing.
C. Flast v. Cohen-A Narrow Exception for
Federal Taxpayer Standing
Forty-five years after Frothingham, the Supreme Court slightly relaxed its
rigid rule precluding general federal taxpayer standing in Flast.4" In Flast,
several federal taxpayers sued the federal government to enjoin a federal
spending program that appropriated funds for the purchase of textbooks and
other instructional material for use in parochial schools.49 The plaintiffs alleged
that the expenditure violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, and claimed standing to maintain the action
solely on their status as federal taxpayers.5" Relying on Frothingham, the federal
district court dismissed the case holding that federal taxpayers do not have
standing to challenge government expenditures.5
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that Frothingham was
not an absolute bar to taxpayer standing and that federal taxpayers may challenge
the constitutionality of a federal spending program so long as "there is a logical
nexus between that status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated."52
The Court reasoned that only upon a showing of this nexus could the plaintiffs
"demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to
satisfy Article III requirements. 53
In the case of federal taxpayer standing, this logical nexus has two aspects.m
"First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between [the taxpayer] status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked."55 To do this, a federal taxpayer
must have alleged the unconstitutionality of a spending program arising under
46. Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1178 (1984).
47. That is not to say that citizens can never sue as federal taxpayers. For example,
federal taxpayers, even under Frothingham, may challenge taxes that are earmarked for
an alleged unconstitutional purpose, and they may also challenge the assessment of their
tax liability. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.13 (3d ed. 1999).
48. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
49. See id. at 85-86.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 88.
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the Taxing and Spending Clause."5 "Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a
nexus between [the taxpayer] status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged."' This means that the taxpayer must have alleged that the
expenditure violated a constitutional right that operates as a specific limitation
upon the spending power of Congress conferred by Article I. If a federal
taxpayer plaintiff can establish both aspects of the logical nexus, "the litigant
will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will
be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.""9
The Flast Court held that the taxpayer plaintiffs had established this dual
logical nexus.'0 First, the plaintiffs challenged a legislative spending program
that arose under the Taxing and Spending Clause.6 Second, by alleging that the
expenditure violated the Establishment Clause, the plaintiffs established a logical
nexus between their status as taxpayers and the alleged constitutional violation.'
The Court explained that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from providing any support to religious institutions and that any government
appropriation for religious purposes is a violation of the Clause.' Therefore, the
Establishment Clause "operates as a specific constitutional limitation" upon the
taxing and spending power of Congress." Having established both aspects of
the logical nexus, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
government expenditure based on their status as federal taxpayers.'
Flast's holding has three noteworthy implications. First, Flast did not
overturn Frothingham, but merely created an exception to the general rule
prohibiting federal taxpayer standing." Second, Flast has proven to be a very
56. See id. The Taxing and Spending Clause states: "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States... .. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
57. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
58. See id. at 102-04.




63. See id. at 103-04.
64. Id. at 104. The Court also noted that "[o]ur history vividly illustrates that one
of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause... was that
the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general." Id. at 103.
65. See id. at 105-06. Because the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to
sue under the Establishment Clause, they did not reach the issue of whether the taxpayers
had standing to challenge the expenditure under the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 104
n.25. While the Court conceded that taxing power can infringe on the Free Exercise
Clause, it suggested that standing in such cases would extend not to all taxpayers, but
only those taxpayers within a specific affected class. See id.
66. See id. at 104-05. The Court held that Flast and Frothingham were completely
2001]
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narrow exception to Frothingham, and its holding may be limited to
Establishment Clause claims.67
Finally, Flast spoke only to standing in the context of federal taxpayers and
did not mention the status of taxpayers suing in other capacities. Subsequent
case law indicates that Frothingham's holding concerning municipal taxpayers
survived the decision.68 Thus, municipal taxpayers still may establish standing
to challenge municipal expenditures based on non-Establishment Clause
claims.69 The question that has created the most confusion, however, and the
question unanswered by Frothingham and Flast, is the status of state taxpayer
standing in federal court.
D. Doremus v. Board of Education of Borough of Hawthorne
-Opening the Door for State Taxpayers?
Sixteen years prior to Flast, in Doremus, the Supreme Court, addressed the
question whether state taxpayers, based on their taxpayer status, could challenge
a state expenditure in federal court. Doremus has created confusion among the
lower courts. The only thing that courts have unanimously agreed upon after
Doremus, is that Doremus, not Flast, controls the issue of state taxpayer standing
in federal court. 0
consistent because Mrs. Frothingham's "constitutional attack was not based on an
allegation that Congress ... had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing and
spending power." Id. at 105. Therefore, Mrs. Frothingham failed to establish the second
aspect of the logical nexus. See id.
67. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) ("[W]e have consistently
adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the general rule against taxpayer
standing.. . ."); Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.
1992) ("[T]he Court has indicated that Flast applies only to cases in which a federal
taxpayer challenges a congressional appropriation . . . that allegedly violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."); Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v. Randall,
891 F.2d 1354, 1358 (8th Cir. 1989) ("We believe that taxpayer standing was created to
specifically permit the airing of establishment claims .... "); Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d
912, 916 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988) ("Flast v. Cohen appears to create
a fairly narrow exception to the [rule against taxpayer standing], and may apply only to
Establishment Clause cases.. ").
68. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (holding that
municipal taxpayers may have standing to challenge a municipal expenditure in federal
court outside the context of the Establishment Clause).
69. See id.
70. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (noting in a state taxpayer case that Doremus "controls the requirements for
taxpayer standing in this case"); Bd. of Educ. v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d
106, 110 (2d Cir. 1995) (indicating that Doremus controls taxpayer standing); Romer,
963 F.2d at 1399 (holding that Flast applies only to "federal taxpayer standing issues,
not questions relating to standing for state taxpayers"); Randall, 891 F.2d at 1356-58
[Vol. 66
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The plaintiffs in Doremus sued in federal court as state taxpayers,
challenging a New Jersey statute that provided for the reading of the Old
Testament at the opening of each public school day. The plaintiff; alleged that
the statute violated the Establishment Cause. The state of New Jersey moved
to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing?"
The Supreme Court granted the state's motion to dismiss holding that state
taxpayers may challenge a state expenditure only if they bring a "good-faith
pocketbook action."' The Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet this
standard because they failed to show that "the statute add[ed] cost to the school
expenses or varie[d] by more than an incomputable scintilla the economy of the
day's work."
75
In making this decision, however, the Doremus Court did not clearly define
the "good-faith pocketbook" test. As a result, the decision has created much
confusion in the lower courts. The critical question left partially unanswered by
the Court was whether it intended to treat state taxpayers more like federal or
municipal taxpayers for the purpose of standing in federal court. On the one
hand, Doremus suggests that there is no distinction between federal and state
taxpayers.!6 The Court stated:
[W]e reiterate what [Frothinghan] said of a federal statute as equally
true when a state act is assailed: 'The party who invokes the power
must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in
come [sic] indefinite way in common with people generally.' r t
As unambiguous as this language seems in favor of treating state taxpayers
like federal taxpayers, the Doremus Court also suggested that state taxpayers,
like municipal taxpayers, could have general standing.78 The Court noted that
(applying Doremus to a state taxpayer's claim); Taub, 842 F.2d at 918 ("[l]n those cases
where violation of the Establishment Clause is not alleged... a state taxpayer must..
.meet the 'good-faith pocketbook' requirement ofDoremus."); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741
F.2d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Flast does not appear to have affected the availability
of standing for state taxpayers challenging state statutes.").
71. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429,430
(1952).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 433.
74. Id. at 434.
75. Id. at431,434.
76. See id. at 433-34.
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it had "found a justiciable controversy" when a state taxpayer "showed a
measurable appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned
solely by the activities complained of."79 This language suggests that a state
taxpayer may have general standing to sue in a state taxpayer capacity so long
as she can show a "measurable appropriation" of state money towards an
allegedly illegal cause.80
Not surprisingly, Doremus has created a split among the federal circuit
courts. Several circuits have relied on Doremus's reference to Frothingham to
conclude that state taxpayers, like federal taxpayers, can not challenge state
government expenditures based upon a mere government appropriation of state
funds.8  Instead, the "good-faith pocketbook" standard requires that state
taxpayers show a "direct and particular financial interest,"82 such as a "monetary
loss due to the allegedly unlawful activity's effect on his tax liability."83 Absent
such a showing, state taxpayers in these circuits will not be able to establish the
requisite direct injury necessary to maintain standing. 4
This rationale, which likens state with federal taxpayers for the purpose of
standing, extends beyond the Article III separation of powers concern. Courts
taking this position have held that in addition to Article III concerns, state
taxpayer cases also raise "an especially compelling federalism concern that
dictates careful attention to the threshold case or controversy requirement of
standing."85 These courts are concerned that "[u]nnecessary or abstract decisions
by federal courts in cases where there is no case or controversy could unduly
constrict experimental state welfare legislation and undermine local self-
determination. '8 6 They reason, then, that the "mere allegation of federal
79. Id. The Court referred to the case of Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), when making this statement. The plaintiff in Everson sued
as a state taxpayer challenging a state statute that used school-district funds to provide
transportation to parochial schools. See id. at 3. While the plaintiff lost the case, the
plaintiff lost on the merits, not for a lack of standing. See id. at 18.
80. See, e.g., Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1180 (9th Cir. 1983).
81. See Bd. of Educ. v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.
1995) ("State taxpayers, like federal taxpayers, do not have standing to challenge the
actions of state government simply because they pay taxes to the state."); Colo.
Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1402 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Supreme Court
jurisprudence indicates that state taxpayers must be likened to federal taxpayers."); Taub
v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 918 (6th Cir. 1988) ("We conclude that the requirements for
federal taxpayer standing announced in Frothingham control the issue of state taxpayer
standing .... ).
82. Bd. ofEduc., 60 F.3d at 110.
83. Romer, 963 F.2d at 1402.
84. See id.; Bd. ofEduc., 60 F.3d at 110; Taub, 842 F.2d at 918.
85. Romer, 963 F.2d at 1403; see also Taub, 842 F.2d at 919 ("Considerations of
federalism should signal the same caution in these circumstances as concern for
preservation of the proper separation of powers in an 'all federal' action.").
86. Romer, 963 F.2d at 1403.
[Vol. 66
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constitutional violations cannot be allowed to clothe a state governmental
decisionmaking process with the ill-fitting garments of federal court scrutiny. '
Such reasoning has lead these courts to conclude that:
The 'direct injury' requirement for standing that has flourished since
Frothingham and Doremus and that defines the appropriate litigants
in a state taxpayer case proves yet again the wisdom of the Framers of
the Constitution when they tied federal court jurisdiction to the "case
or controversy" requirement and its attendant standing... doctrines.'
The Ninth Circuit has taken a markedly different view from the other
circuits by interpreting the Doremus "good-faith pocketbook" standard to require
neither a showing of injury apart from general taxpayers, nor a showing of an
increased tax burden. 9 Instead, the Ninth Circuit has held that a state taxpayer
has standing to challenge a state expenditure in federal court if "[t]he pleadings
set forth with specificity amounts of money appropriated and spent for allegedly
unlawful purposes."9 The court relied on the "measurable appropriation"
language in Doremus, and Everson v. Board ofEducation of Ewing Township,9
a case cited therein,' in reaching this conclusion. 3 The court reasoned:
The difference between state taxpayer standing and federal taxpayer
standing at the time of Doremus, then, was essentially one of
economic relativity. Federal taxpayers could not, as a matter of law,
show sufficient injury to have standing after Frothingham. State
taxpayers could still maintain taxpayer suits if their pleadings were
sufficient. They were sufficient if they set forth the relationship
between taxpayer, tax dollars, and the allegedly illegal government
activity.4
This interpretation, then, "does not require that the taxpayer prove that her tax
burden will be lightened by elimination of the questioned expenditure. '
The Supreme Court later clarified the holding ofDoremus in ASARCO, Ina.
v. Kadish," although it did not expressly address the conflict among the lower
courts, nor did it expressly overrule any cases. The plaintiffs in ASARCO sued
as state taxpayers in federal court, challenging an Arizona mineral lease statute
87. Id.
88. IL
89. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1180 (9th Cir. 1984).
90. Id
91. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
92. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
93. See Hoohuli, 741 F.2d at 1178.
94. ML
95. See Cannack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
2001]
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because it "deprived the school trust funds of millions of dollars thereby
resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes."' In dismissing the claim, the Court
held that "we have likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus we have
refused to confer standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing of 'direct
injury,' pecuniary or otherwise.""8 The Court further held that because education
in Arizona was not funded solely through the trust funds at issue, that it was
"pure speculation whether the lawsuit would result in any actual tax relief for
respondents."99 The Court then concluded that because the possibility of
pecuniary relief was so "remote, fluctuating, and uncertain," the plaintiffs had
failed to establish the direct injury necessary for standing.'00
ASARCO, while seemingly a definitive resolution of the conflict among the
circuit courts, has not received much attention. The Ninth Circuit, which
adopted the "measurable appropriation" standard, continues to recognize it as the
test for taxpayer standing.'01 Two years after the ASARCO decision, the Ninth
Circuit held that to establish standing a state taxpayer does not have to "prove
that her tax burden will be lightened by the elimination of the expenditure."'0 2
The Eighth Circuit also continues to recognize a form of the "measurable
appropriation" test."0 However, taxpayer standing in the Eighth Circuit is
anything but clear.
E. The State of State Taxpayer Standing in the Eighth Circuit
It is unclear exactly how the Eighth Circuit has interpreted Doremus. After
Minnesota Federation of Teachers v. Randall,' 4 it appears that the court adopted
the measurable appropriation standard of the Ninth Circuit. 5 Randall was an
action brought by a state taxpayer who contested the use of prayer in public
schools. The district court interpreted Doremus to require proof of an increased
97. Id. at 614.
98. Id. at 613-14 (citing Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342
U.S. 429,434 (1952)).
99. Id. at 614.
100. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham v. Mellon), 262 U.S. 447,
487 (1923)).
101. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 769.
103. See Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v. Randall, 891 F.2d 1354,1356-58 (8th Cir.
1989). However, it is not clear exactly where the Eighth Circuit stands on the issue of
taxpayer standing. See discussion infra Part III.E.
104. 891 F.2d 1354 (8th Cir. 1989).
105. See id. at 1356-58. Indeed, other circuits have interpreted the Eighth Circuit
as adopting this standard. See Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394,
1400 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he Eighth Circuit ... agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's approach to state taxpayer standing"); Cammack, 932 F.2d at 769 (citing the
Eighth Circuit as following the Ninth's Circuit approach).
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tax burden and dismissed the plaintiff's case for lack of standing because he
failed to show an increase in his tax bill." s The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding
that "Doremnus ... clearly indicated that an increase in the plaintiff's tax burden
was only one way injury could be shown .... [T]he Court believed that direct
expenditures would also suffice."' 7 The Eighth Circuit held that state taxpayers
are not required "to show an increase in their tax burdens to allege sufficient
injury... only ... that there has been a disbursement of tax money in potential
violation of constitutional guarantees.' 0 3
Randall, however, was a case involving the Establishment Clause, and it is
unclear whether the Eighth Circuit will expand its holding beyond this area. The
court suggested that its holding applies only to Establishment Clause claims
when it stated, "[w]e believe that taxpayer standing was created to specifically
permit the airing of establishment claims... ."' Furthermore, this holding is
consistent with those circuits that have expressly rejected the measurable
appropriation standard, because those courts do not require a state taxpayer to
show an increased tax burden when alleging an Establishment Clause
violation."0 Therefore, because the court has only applied its holding to
Establishment Clause claims, and because no circuit appears to require a
showing of an increased tax bill when the Establishment Clause is at issue, it is
unclear whether the Eighth Circuit will extend its measurable appropriation
standard to non-Establishment Clause claims.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
.A. Tze Majoriy
In Tarsney, the Eighth Circuit considered whether state taxpayers had
standing to bring a Free Exercise"' claim challenging Minnesota's use of state
funds to provide abortions for indigent women."' In so doing, the court
examined whether the holding of Flast would support taxpayer standing for Free
Exercise claims as well as Establishment Clause claims."'
106. See Randall, 891 F.2d at 1356.
107. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1358.
109. Id.
110. See Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1401 (10th Cir.
1992) (requiring a showing of an increased tax burden only "where an Establishment
Clause violation is not asserted"); Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 1988)
(noting the "distinctive treatment of standing when the Establishment Clause is
involved").
111. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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The court distinguished Establishment Clause claims from Free Exercise
Clause claims for purposes of taxpayer standing. The court held that when "the
government spends public money in violation of the Establishment Clause, a
taxpayer suffers a direct injury because the government is improperly promoting
religion.""' 4 Therefore, the Establishment Clause "operates as a specific
limitation on Congress' taxing and spending power" and taxpayers have standing
to sue under the Clause.' 5
The Free Exercise Clause, on the other hand, is "not analyzed in the same
way for purposes of taxpayer standing."'"6 When the government appropriates
funds, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause "unless the expenditure
directly prevents an individual from exercising religious beliefs.""... Thus, the
"injury does not arise from the expenditure itself, but from the resulting
limitation on religious exercise...18 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
the "Free Exercise Clause does not operate as a specific limitation on the taxing
and spending power of Congress which the Supreme Court discussed in Flast,
and taxpayers do not have standing to bring claims under it unless they can show
direct injury."'" 9
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Magill argued that while the majority's analysis of
Flast was persuasive, "the majority erred when it focused its attention on
Flas' 2 as controlling the outcome of the case. Judge Magill stated that "[t]he
downfall of the majority's analysis began when it examined what is clearly a
case of state taxpayer standing under a line of cases that deal only with federal
taxpayer standing."'' Judge Magill stated that "the test that Flast announced
only applies to federal taxpayer cases; in other words, cases against the federal
government."'" Moreover, Judge Magill noted that every court that has
considered the issue of state taxpayer standing, including the Eighth Circuit, has
held that Doremus, and not Flast, controls the issue of state taxpayer standing













Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/4
TAXPAYER STANDING
Judge Magill noted that, while the circuits have adopted Doremus as the
controlling case on state taxpayer standing, they disagree on its application.'
Furthermore, Judge Magill asserted that, while the Eighth Circuit has adopted
the measurable appropriation standard of the Ninth Circuit in Establishment
Clause cases,"~ the Eighth Circuit has left it unclear whether it will apply that
standard to non-Establishment Clause claims. 6 Judge Magill stated that it was
possible that the Eighth Circuit would instead adopt the increased tax burden
standard'27 for non-Establishment Clause claims.'2
Judge Magill noted that, even though the parties had mistakenly relied on
Flast in their arguments, that "ignorance of the parties should not carry over to
this court.' Therefore, he concluded that "[b]y conflating federal and state
taxpayer standing, the majority [] failed to discuss the difficult issues of state
taxpayer standing raised in [the] appeal.' 30
V. COMMENT
A. The Majority Is in Error
In Tarsney, the Eighth Circuit applied the logic of Flast to deny standing
to state taxpayers bringing a Free Exercise Clause claim.'3' The majority, as the
dissent concedes, 32 correctly determined that Flast does not grant standing to
Free Exercise claims because the Clause simply "does not operate as a specific
limitation on the taxing and spending power of Congress which the Supreme
Court discussed in Flast .... 'M The dissent, however, correctly noted that the
majority was in error, because Dorenus, and not Flast, is controlling on the issue
of state taxpayer standing in federal courL
The Supreme Court did not intend for Flast to apply to state taxpayer
standing because its holding was limited to federal expenditures that arise under
the Taxing and Spending Clause. 3 As the dissent in Tarsney correctly noted,
124. See id.
125. See discussion supra Part IHI.D.
126. See Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 942 (8th Cir. 2000).
127. See discussion supra Part III.D.
128. See Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 942.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 936.
132. See id at 939 (commenting that the majority's analysis was "persuasive if this
case involved federal taxpayer standing").
133. Id. at 936.
134. See id. at 940.
135. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968); see also supra note 70 (citing
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the federal courts that have considered the issue of state taxpayer standing have
all applied Doremus.'36 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in ASARCO, used Doremus,
not Flast, to dismiss a non-Establishment Clause claim brought by state
taxpayers.'37 Therefore, the Tarsney court was in error in applying Flast to a
state taxpayer suit and should have established that Doremus controlled the
issue.
After establishing that Doremus controlled, the Tarsney court then should
have addressed the more difficult question of which Doremus interpretation to
apply to non-Establishment Clause claims: the measurable appropriation
standard'38 (which it has seemingly adopted), or the increased tax burden
standard. 39 After the Supreme Court's holding in ASARCO, it appears that the
court is obligated to choose the latter. 4 ' The ASARCO Court unambiguously
held that state taxpayers may not establish state taxpayer standing absent a
showing of a direct injury, i.e., a pecuniary loss.'4' Therefore, the lower courts
that have continued to follow the measurable appropriation standard subsequent
to ASARCO are in error.
B. The Supreme Court Should Reconsider Its Current
Taxpayer Standing Classifications
Although ASARCO is binding precedent for lower courts, that decision is
not necessarily correct. The core problem is the Court's differential treatment
between state and municipal taxpayers. One justification for the differential
treatment is the difference in "economic relativity" between state taxpayers and
the state, and municipal taxpayers and the municipality. 42 But it is hard to
justify this distinction considering the population disparities between states and
municipalities. For instance, New York City alone has over sixteen times the
population of the entire state of Wyoming."' If economic relativity is the
rationale for distinguishing municipal taxpayers from state and federal taxpayers,
136. See Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 940 (8th Cir. 2000).
137. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1989).
138. See discussion supra Part III.D.
139. See discussion supra Part III.D.
140. See Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1402 (10th Cir.
1992) ("After reviewing the reasoning in ASARCO, we conclude that we must reject the
Ninth Circuit's formulation of state taxpayer standing because it equates state taxpayers
with municipal taxpayers for standing purposes.").
141. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 613-14.
142. See, e.g., Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989).
143. According to an estimate by the U.S. Census Bureau, New York had a 1999
population of 8,712,600, while Wyoming had a population of 479,602. United States
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it is hard to classify aNew York City citizen's injury as direct, while classifying
a Wyoming citizen's injury as "remote, fluctuating and uncertain."'"
Recent developments in federalism also make it difficult to square the
Court's differential treatment between state and municipal taxpayers. Some
lower courts have held that federalism concerns warrant restricting state taxpayer
standing in federal courts to prevent federal courts from undermining state
welfare legislation and local self-determination. 4" The Supreme Court,
however, has not traditionally afforded this same protection from the federal
government to municipalities." The Court has traditionally "predicated the
constitutional status of local governments entirely on the theory that a local
government is merely an administrative arm of the state, utterly lacking in
autonomy .... 1147
More recently, however, the Supreme Court "has treated localities as active,
locally responsive governments, not just administrative arms of the state."' The
Court increasingly has started to recognize municipal autonomy in several
different contexts. 49 It has recognized that "locally accountable governmental
units are significant in practice and desirable in theory."'50 This has "led it to
affirm the representative nature of local governments, the operational
independence of local governments from their states, and the important role local
governments play in making law and policy.'' Therefore, because of this
increasing recognition of municipal autonomy, the Court should not now
distinguish municipal taxpayer standing from state taxpayer standing on the
grounds of federalism.
144. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,614 (1989) (citing Massachusetts v.
Mellon (Frothingham v. Mellon), 262 U.S. 447,487 (1923)).
145. See Romer, 963 F.2d at 1403.
146. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 99 (1990).
147. Briffault, supra note 146, at 85; see also Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (holding that "[m]unicipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them").
148. Briffault, supra note 146, at 85; see also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474,481 (1968) ('In a word, institutions of local government have always been a major
aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of
increasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens:).
149. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (the Court,
applying the rational basis standard of review, gives great deference to a municipal
zoning ordinance restricting land use to family residents); Avery, 390 U.S. at 479-81
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to municipalities because municipalities
are governments that have autonomous decision making authority on behalf of local
residents).
150. Briffault, supra note 146, at 99.
151. Briffault, supra note 146, at 99.
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The Court should reconsider its taxpayer standing classifications. If
economic relativity truly is the Court's rationale for the distinction, it is
inconceivable that all state taxpayers have a remote and fluctuating economic
relationship with the state treasury, while all municipal taxpayers have a direct
and immediate interest with their local treasury. Furthermore, if federalism
concerns are behind the Court's rationale for the distinction, it no longer follows
that those same concerns do not also apply to local governments. The Court,
therefore, should abrogate this distinction and either allow both state and
municipal taxpayer standing upon a showing of a measurable government
appropriation or deny standing to taxpayers altogether. The Court needs to make
a change, either way, because logic no longer supports the Court's current
classification.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taxpayer standing has caused much confusion among the courts. The
Supreme Court's application of different and unclear standards to different
classes of taxpayers is hard to reconcile and has resulted in inconsistent decisions
among the lower courts. The Eighth Circuit has not escaped this confusion. By
applying Flast to a state taxpayer case, the Eighth Circuit missed an opportunity
to set the record straight. Instead, the Eighth Circuit should have applied
Doremus to the present case, followed the precedent set by ASARCO, and
dismissed the case for lack of standing. While the outcome would have been the
same, the court's erroneous path in reaching this outcome unfortunately has
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